IBM’s Center for Business Optimization

I am in New York to give a talk to IBM’s Center for Business Optimization. Bill Pulleyblank is heading this activity. Bill has had a really interesting career: he started in academia, and did really fundamental work in combinatorial optimization. He then moved to IBM, starting at Watson Research and moving on to doing things like heading the Blue Gene Project, which created the world’s fastest supercomputer. CBO is a startup with IBM that tries to merge the assets of IBM (software packages, etc.) with the consulting skills of IBM Business Consultants (formerly PriceWaterhouseCooper’s consulting arm).

It is exciting to see a company like IBM take optimization seriously. The projects I have chatted with people about look like “real” optimization and business analytics: data mining and modeling approaches to fraud dectection (both tax fraud and Medicare fraud), supply chain optimization, marketing design, and so on. They have a number of case studies that outline their various projects.

Operations Research Job Prospects

Money Magazine and salary.com have a ranking of 166 job titles, based on salary and job prospects. I was happy to see “College Professor” as the second best job (good salary, good growth, lots of freedom). Having Operations Research Analyst mired in roughly 120th place (out of 166) was less fun to see. The salary for the field is good, but job growth was relatively low. Still, OR Analyst beat out mathematician, economist, physicist, librarian and many other seemingly appealing fields.

Descriptive versus Prescriptive

Working in a business school (the Tepper School at Carnegie Mellon), many of my colleagues are economists (or “financial economists” as many of my finance colleagues are titled). One of the big hurdles we have in communicating is a differing view of the purpose of models. For many economists, models are used to describe behavior. For instance, a model of certain types of incentives may lead to particular outcome behavior. If we see the outcome behavior, this suggests the model is a good one. If an economist does not see the outcome behavior, then there is a puzzle at best, and a bad model at worst.

For an ORer (a word I just made up, because OR person sound stilted), models are almost always prescriptive: they tell you what to do. For that same model, an ORer will, if happy with the model, not worry about whether the outcome behavior is happening. If not, then people are doing things wrong, and should smarten up and follow the OR prescription.

Articles like the one today in the New York Times (subscription required) make me feel happier about the OR approach. People, even reasonably sophisticated people, just don’t seem to make good decisions. The example is drawn from finance, but examples abound:

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David Simchi-Levi Presentation


David Simchi-Levi is here at CMU today speaking on inventory systems where the decision maker is not risk neutral. David is a professor at MIT and Editor-in-Chief of Operations Research. He also runs his own company, LogicTools. I think he has given up sleep.

It is surprising that there is so little research on risk-averse decision makers in the operations management context. This clearly is a useful integration of economic theory and operations research and also involves the interface between finance and operations in a firm. In David’s work, even marketing comes into play since prices can be set in the model in order to influence demand.

Work like this often spends time in pages of greek letters with subscripts, and this paper is no different (though David is an excellent lecturer, so it was not as mind-numbing as some lectures like this).

With fixed costs for ordering, even models with risk neutral decision makers are hard to solve. Normally, the optimal decisions are set with an (s,S,p) policy: if inventory is under s, order up to S, and set price p. But suppose the inventory level is a bit above s. Should price be set high in order to decrease demand or should the order go up to S, and price be set low. This example shows that the price has a discontinuity, making it hard to get characteristics of the solution.

With risk aversion, things get more complicated. For the case where there is no fixed ordering cost, the optimal policy is a base stock policy, but the base stock level depends on the wealth level of the decision maker. With fixed costs, for exponential utility, the optimal inventory policy is independent of wealth, making things a bit easier (though it is still hard to figure out the exact policy).

One interesting aspect of this that came up in Q&A is the need to combine pricing and inventory decisions. Most companies are not aligned this way: marketing sets price, while operations sets inventory. Even in these complicated models, though, the results generally look like “Operations, do (s,S); Marketing, set price p”. This suggests very tight integration is not needed: coordination is enough.

When you add financial hedging aspects, there is still this decoupling aspect: the financial decisions do not affect the operational decisions.

It would take someone more skilled than I to explain these results to a general audience, but I find it interesting that models that contain all of marketing (price setting), operations (inventory setting) and finance (hedging) are amenable to analytical solution. This seems a very rich research area.

A Stonewall Connection to Operational Research


My parents grew up on farms outside a then-small (now medium) sized town in Manitoba named Stonewall. For a period in the early 1900s, a boy named Charles Goodeve lived in Stonewall. He lived there for about 10 years, before his family moved to Winnipeg. There is an article in the Stonewall Argus (the Gordon Trick mentioned is my father) about his life, including his work during World War II in the British Navy. Among other things, he figured out how to protect ships from underwater mines through a demagnetization process.

The operational research connection? In 1948, Sir Charles Goodeve founded the OR Club, which would later become the Operational Research Society.

Tournament Time!


The NCAA Tournament is irresistable to OR types. Predicting the tournament has proven a rich area of application. Jay Coleman of the University of North Florida has a scorecard approach that gives probabilities of wins for every game in the first round. For three of the 32 games, his approach favors the lower seeded team (including number 10 Alabama over number 7 Marquette. As far as number 1 seeds go, his method gives a 99%+ chance to Villanova and Duke in their first game (a number 16 has never beat a number 1) but just 97% for UConn and 95% for Memphis.

Joel Sokol of Georgia Tech has done a lot of work in this area. He has some interesting comments on the 2006 brackets.

INFORMS has some other pointers in this area.

Anyone else like to talk about their OR approaches to this?

Operations Research and CIOs

United Airlines now has a CIO who is also responsible for operations research and other activities. This seems a natural, if somewhat unusual move (OR is often under manufacturing, operations or some other structure). OR is all about using information, and as firms realize the value of information (and CIOs) is in their ability to extract knowledge from information, more OR may be in the hands of the CIO.